Abstract-The roaming service enables mobile subscribers to access the internet service anytime and anywhere, which can fulfill the requirement of ubiquitous access for the emerging paradigm of networking, e.g., the Internet of Things (IoT). In this paper, we propose a conditional privacy-preserving authentication with access linkability (CPAL) for roaming service, to provide universal secure roaming service and multilevel privacy preservation. CPAL provides an anonymous user linking function by utilizing a novel group signature technique, which can not only efficiently hide users' identities but also enables the authorized entities to link all the access information of the same user without knowing the user's real identity. Specifically, by using the master linking key possessed by the trust linking server, the authorized foreign network operators or service providers can link the access information from the user to improve its service, while preserving user anonymity, e.g., using individual access information to analyze user preferences without revealing user's identity. Furthermore, the subscribers can also use this functionality to anonymously query their usage of service. In addition, CPAL has an efficient revocation function, which revokes a group of users at the same time. Through extensive analysis, we demonstrate that CPAL resists various security threats and provides more flexible privacy preservation compared to the existing schemes. Meanwhile, performance evaluations demonstrate its efficiency in terms of communication and computation overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the advancements in various mobile and wireless networks, e.g., long-term evolution (LTE) [1] , worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) [2] , and roadside-to-vehicle communication systems [3] , [4] , pervasive Internet access becomes a reality, enabling mobile subscribers (MSs) to enjoy Internet service anytime and anywhere [5] - [8] . This also caters to the demand of ubiquitous access for the emerging paradigm of networking, e.g., the Internet of Things (IoT) [9] - [13] , which is rapidly gaining ground in the scenario of wireless telecommunications. Due to the complementary nature of the existing networks, interworking among them is attractive [14] - [17] . However, within the heterogeneous networks, ensuring the secure and efficient roaming service is still challenging [18] , [19] , because different networks have different security policies and authentication protocols. Consequently, any secure roaming scheme dedicated for only one type of network technology cannot fulfill the security requirements from the heterogeneous networks.
In heterogeneous networks, user privacy preservation has become an important and challenging issue in the roaming service, and has been widely studied by researchers. In most existing secure roaming schemes, the privacy preservation only equates with anonymity, i.e., hiding users' identities. However, this may not be suitable for diverse privacy requirements in real world [4] , [20] - [23] . There are a variety of personalized services associated with privacy in the real applications; therefore, according to different privacy preservation requirements, the privacy preservation should be flexibly or elaborately controlled according to a desired level. To this end, foreign network (FN) operators or service providers may need individual access information on the usage of services, while preserving anonymity. This means that FN operators or service providers can link all the access information of the same user for statistical purposes, but they cannot know who the user is, what the current membership status of the user is, and the history of the user joining and revocation. Meanwhile, a user may want to provide a specific network operator or service provider with linking capability, and remain unlinkable to others. Moreover, there may be a large number of mobile users that need to be revoked in the network anytime due to various reasons, e.g., when any illegal or exceptional events occur. However, the existing secure roaming schemes [24] , [25] do not support this function. This will significantly increase the burden of the home authentication server and potentially reduce the efficiency of the whole network. Therefore, efficient user revocation for dynamic membership in the secure roaming services is important.
In this paper, to provide universal secure roaming service and anonymous user linkability, we propose a conditional privacypreserving authentication with access linkability (CPAL) for roaming service by utilizing the novel group signature technique [26] . In the proposed CPAL, the strong anonymous authentication, session key agreement, user tracking, and anonymous user linking are provided, which make the privacy preservation more flexible. Meanwhile, CPAL has the efficient revocation function for dynamic membership, where a group of users can be revoked simultaneously. The main contributions of this paper are threefold.
1) First, we present a generic secure roaming architecture, which implements new features to achieve the corresponding security goals. Meanwhile, to fulfill different privacy preservation requirements, we introduce the multilevel privacy preservation. Especially, the privacy-preservation ability is divided into three levels, i.e., authentication, anonymity, and authorized anonymous user linking (AAUL). 2) Second, we further propose a conditional privacy-preserving authentication with access linkability for roaming service, called CPAL. The proposed CPAL scheme can not only achieve session key agreement, strong anonymous authentication, and fast user tracking (Levels 1 and 2) but also provide anonymous user linkability (Level 3). Moreover, CPAL supports efficient joining and revocation functions for dynamic membership. Particularly, it can revoke a group of users simultaneously, which makes the user revocation more efficient.
3) Third, we analyze the security strength and privacypreservation ability of CPAL. In addition, through comparative performance analysis, we demonstrate that CPAL is efficient in terms of the communication and computation overhead. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the related work. In Section III, we introduce the network architecture and design goals. In Section IV, we recall the bilinear pairings and a hybrid linear combination encryption (HLCE). Then, we present our CPAL and discuss some applications related to CPAL in Section V, followed by its security analysis and performance evaluation in Sections VI and VII, respectively. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The existing secure roaming schemes can mainly be classified into three categories: symmetric-cryptosystem-based (SCbased), asymmetric-cryptosystem-based (AC-based), and hybrid schemes.
The SC-based secure roaming schemes, e.g., EAP-based authentication and key agreement protocols [5] , [27] - [31] , are designed based on standard protocols [32] , [33] . SC-based schemes are widely accepted because they are compatible with standard protocols. However, they require the interaction between the foreign server and the home server, which may lead to the single point of failure [34] , and induce large authentication transmission overhead because of the long distance between the foreign server and the home server. Moreover, recent studies [35] , [36] have shown that SC-based schemes cannot provide strong user anonymity and nontraceability, and most of them cannot provide session key security and resistance to sophisticated attacks. Another weakness is that, they cannot flexibly be applied to all application scenarios because each protocol is only suitable for the corresponding network architecture, this may increase the complexity of the entire system. Jiang and Shi [37] , [38] propose several mutual authentication and key exchange schemes for roaming services. In [37] and [38] , public key cryptography, e.g., digital signature and DiffieHellman key exchange, is adopted on the basis of SC-based schemes, which can further enhance the security of roaming service. However, they still induce large authentication transmission overhead due to the interaction between the foreign server and the home server. More importantly, their schemes cannot provide strong privacy preservation.
The limitations of SC-based schemes have greatly stimulated the research of AC-based schemes [24] , [25] , [39] - [42] , because AC-based schemes can provide more security, stronger privacy preservation, and require fewer communication rounds. These advantages have led to the recent increasing popularity of the AC-based secure roaming schemes. One of the important security properties in the AC-based secure roaming schemes is strong user anonymity, which includes user anonymity and user untraceablility. The former means that except for the home server, the user's identity cannot be revealed to anyone else including the foreign server; the latter means that except for the home server, any past or future protocol runs of the same user cannot be linked by anyone including the foreign server [24] .
AC-based secure roaming schemes have been studied by many researchers. In this section, we briefly discuss some research works closely related to CPAL. In [24] , Yang et al. propose a universal authentication protocols for anonymous wireless communications. In their scheme, two levels of user anonymity in roaming are considered: 1) Weak User Anonymity that concerns about user anonymity against eavesdroppers and 2) Strong User Anonymity that concerns about user anonymity against both eavesdroppers and foreign servers. Accordingly, they present two protocols to achieve weak user anonymity and strong user anonymity, respectively. However, He et al. [25] find that scheme [24] cannot satisfy user untraceablility. Therefore, they propose a privacy-preserving universal authentication protocol for wireless communications. They point that a privacy-preserving user authentication scheme should satisfy the following requirements: server authentication, subscription validation, provision of user revocation function, key establishment, user anonymity, and untraceablility.
However, the existing privacy-preserving authentication schemes for roaming service cannot provide anonymous user linkability that makes the authorized entities, e.g., FN operators or service providers, have the ability to anonymously link the access information from the user for statistical purposes. This may not be enough for diverse applications in the roaming service.
III. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we present the generic security roaming network architecture, and identify our design goals.
A. Network Architecture A MS can access the FN through the access point (AP), e.g., E-UTRAN eNB, WiMAX BS, and IEEE 802.11b AP. For an MS, there exist only one HN and multiple FNs. The HAC's responsibility is that issuing the secret signing key for new joining MSs and opening a signature and generating a proof to reveal the corresponding MS when dispute occurs. The TLS is in charge of discerning whether those signatures are from the same MS without knowing MS's identity. The VAS is responsible for performing access authentication for the MSs accessing the FN.
B. Design Goals
Our design goal in this paper is to develop a CPAL for roaming service. Especially, the following goals should be achieved:
1) Strong Anonymous Access Authentication: First, the proposed scheme should provide strong anonymous access authentication. Specifically, it requires that authentication messages, which are interacted by the MS and the VAS, have not been altered during the transmission, i.e., if the adversary A forges and/or modifies the authentication messages, the malicious operations should be detected. Meanwhile, the identity of the MS cannot be revealed to adversary A or the VAS.
2) User Tracking on a Disputed Access Request: An important and challenging issue for roaming service with efficient privacy preservation is to maintain traceability for all the access messages in the presence of the anonymous access authentication. Without the tracking function, the above anonymous access authentication can only prevent an outside attack, but cannot deal with an inside one. For instance, an inside attacker could launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or impersonation attack, provided with no traceability by the HAC. In a DoS attack, the adversary sends a large number of fake access messages to jam the channel or to consume the rare computation resources of the VAC; while in an impersonation attack, the adversary actively pretends to be another MS to send false access request messages.
3) Anonymous User Linking: In order to provide CPAL, i.e., anonymity can be flexibly or elaborately controlled according to the corresponding requirements, the network operators or service providers that are authorized by the HAC or MS can acquire MS's statistics on the usage of services, while MS's identity will not be revealed.
4) Efficient User Revocation for Dynamic Membership: Due to some reasons (e.g., the subscription period of a user has expired or a user's secret key has been compromised), an efficient user revocation function should be proposed, especially for dynamic membership. That means the user revocation function can revoke a group of users simultaneously, which makes the whole scheme more flexible and efficient.
Meanwhile, CPAL can provide a universal secure roaming service. That means the proposed CPAL and its signaling flows can be used in any roaming scenario regardless of the type of networks that the MS is visiting. Moreover, the proposed CPAL scheme should meet all security requirements in previous schemes.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we outline the bilinear pairing technique, and introduce the HLCE, which will serve as the basis of the proposed CPAL scheme.
A. Bilinear Maps
Let G , G , and G be multiplicative groups of prime order . The bilinear map : G G G has the following properties: 1) Bilinearity:
G , G , and Z , ; 2) Nondegenerate:
, such that has order , i.e., is a generator of G ; 3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ,for any G and G .
Definition 1:
A bilinear parameter generator G is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter as input, and outputs a 5-tuple G G G where is -bit prime number; G , G , and G are three groups with the same order ; and : G G G is a nondegenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map.
B. Hybrid Linear Combination Encryption
In [26] , Hwang et al. introduce an HLCE scheme that is used for constructing their novel group signature algorithm, which is described as follows: 1) KeyGen: It chooses G , G , and then computes the public key and outputs its corresponding secret key . 2) Enc: Given the public key and a message G G , it chooses Z . Then, it computes a ciphertext . 3) Dec: Given the ciphertext , it computes the plaintext as follows: and .
V. THE PROPOSED CPAL SCHEME In this section, we describe our proposed CPAL scheme, which consists of five parts, System Initialization, Roaming, User Tracking Algorithm, Anonymous User Linking, and User Revocation. The notations used in the scheme are defined in Table I .
A. System Initialization
Given the security parameter , the HAC first generates the bilinear parameters G G G by running G . Then, the HAC chooses G , G , and Z . Next, it computes , and . The HAC also chooses a cryptographic hash function , where Z . After that, the home domain public key HDPK will be published as:
where , and will be updated once user revocation occurs. Then, the HAC generates the master issuing key , the master opening key , and the master linking key , respectively. When an MS submits its identity for registering itself to the HN, the following procedures are performed:
Step 1) The MS with makes use of a standard signature technique to generate a signing key and the corresponding public verification key .
Step 2) The MS with chooses Z , and then computes G and . Next, the MS sends ( ) to the HAC. (Fig. 2 ) that is built by the HAC.
B. Roaming
In this phase, when MS roams from the HN to an FN, the mutual authentication between MS and the VAS should be accomplished before the MS accesses the FN. Note that the HN and the FNs have established cooperative relations through the roaming agreements, which make the MSs registered in the HN access the FN and obtain the service provided by the FN during roaming. Therefore, the HDPK and related information of HN have been transmitted to the FN in advance. Meanwhile, the VAS makes use of a standard signature technique to generate a signing key and the corresponding public verification key . Fig. 3 shows the access authentication between the MS and the VAS during roaming, and the detailed steps are described as follows.
Step 1) MS sends access request to the VAS; the VAS chooses a random number Z and computes , and then sends to the MS.
Step 2) Upon receipt of , MS first chooses a random number Z , and computes and ; then it generates its authentication message and proceeds as follows: MS chooses Z , and computes , , , , and . Step 3) MS also picks Z , and computes
Step 4) In order to generate a signature of , MS computes , and
. Finally, MS generates the signature , and then sends together with to the VAS.
Step 5) Upon receiving the and from MS , the VAS first generates session key between MS and the FN, and then computes Then, the VAS checks if If verification is successful, the VAS accepts session key between MS and the FN for subsequent communication.
Step 6) After that, the VAS computes a signature , and sends back to MS .
Step 7) MS verifies the by using . If verification is successful, it accepts the sk, and can access the FN successfully.
C. User Tracking Algorithm
Once a dispute occurs on an access request during roaming, the CPAL is equipped with an algorithm for tracking the corresponding user of the disputed access request message. If a grievant (e.g., an FN), denoted as JUDGE, raises doubts about one access request, it will ask the HAC to track the MS's identity related to the disputed access request message. The detailed steps are as follows.
Step 1) The HAC first recovers as from the signature of the disputed access request message. By using a binary search on the RegList, the HAC finds the corresponding to such that in the RegList. If they match, the HAC retrieves corresponding , and .
Step 2) The HAC chooses Z , and then computes , and . After that, the HAC generates a proof ( )), and then sends the proof together with , and to JUDGE.
, where is an updated value of (if there is no upgrade, then ).
Step 4) JUDGE checks if the following equalities hold:
where , and are in the initial home domain public key . If these two equalities hold, it proves that MS has ever accessed the FN and requested the corresponding services, and it cannot repudiate that.
D. Anonymous User Linking
The network operators or service providers that are authorized by the HAC or MS , denoted as AUTLINKER, may need user's statistics on the usage of services.
First, the HAC sends the master linking key to the appointed AUTLINKER. Assume that the AUTLINKER has collected some of signatures and the corresponding messages in the previous access of MS , e.g., two pairs of signatures and messages, ( ) and ( ). The AUTLINKER first checks if the signatures are valid. If so, using , it computes If , it manifests that these signatures and the corresponding messages generated by the same MS registered in the HN, while MS's identity will not be revealed.
E. User Revocation
User revocation can be executed when any illegal or exceptional events occur, e.g., MS's secret key has been compromised, and the punishment for defaulting MS. In our CPAL, the user revocation is realized by implementing two key update algorithms, i.e., HDPK Update and usk Update.
First of all, a revocation event counter is defined, which is increased by 1 when a new revocation event occurs. If a set of keys need to be revoked for one revocation event, let the initial home domain public key be G G Let the current home domain public key be Meanwhile, assume that there are MSs, which correspond to keys to be revoked, and then the user revocation list user revocation list (URL) is formed as Then, HDPK Update and usk Update are executed as follows: 1) HDPK Update is used to update an HDPK. To update the current to the latest , HDPK Update works as follows:
As mentioned before, in order to update HDPK, we only need to update . Therefore, the HAC computes where . The latest . 2) usk Update is used to update a user's signing key. To update a user signing key from to the latest , usk Update works as follows:
By using URL and , it computes ( for any ).
F. Discussion
So far we have introduced the CPAL in detail, which can provide anonymous user linking function. In this section, we further discuss some applications related to CPAL.
1) User Service Query in the FN: When a user wants to check its own service usage in an FN, first, the user can acquire the master linking key from the TLS. Assume that the FN has built a service usage list, and an example is shown in Table II . The first column is collected signatures and the corresponding messages in the previous access of MSs. The second and third columns are date and service type, respectively. The fourth and fifth columns are service time and billing. After the user accesses the FN, it can check its own service usage by searching this list. The user gets some signatures according to the corresponding conditions, e.g., service type is type 1 and access dates are 2013/12/16 and 2013/12/02, thus the user can get ( ) and ( ). Then, the user can execute the algorithm in Section V-D by using . If ( ) and ( ) all belong to this user, the user can look up its own total service time and billing of service type 1, while its identity would not be revealed. Besides, more specific applications with the anonymous user linking function can be further developed according to the needs of users or service providers.
2) Application Scenario: The term "roaming" originates from the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), referring to the extension of connectivity service in a location that is different from the home location where the service was registered. In particular, roaming is the ability for a cellular user to automatically make and receive voice calls, send and receive data, or access other services, including home data services, when traveling outside the geographical coverage area of the HN, by means of using a visited network. With the development of wireless communications, the concept of roaming can be extended to the emerging paradigm of networking, e.g., IoT, VANET, and e-Health. When these users want to access an FN, which is different from the HN where the service was registered, CPAL can be applied to the access process to provide security and privacy preservations. In this sense, CPAL has universality and is suitable for a variety of application scenarios.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed CPAL scheme. In particular, following the security and the privacy preservation goals discussed earlier, our analysis will focus on how the proposed CPAL scheme can provide strong anonymous mutual authentication and key agreement, efficient user tracking, user revocation, and anonymous user linking functions. 
A. The Proposed

B. The Proposed CPAL Scheme can Provide an Efficient User Tracking Function
Once a dispute occurs on an access request during roaming, the CPAL is equipped with an algorithm for tracking the corresponding user of the disputed access request message. If a grievant (e.g., an FN), denoted as JUDGE, raises doubts about one access request, it will ask the HAC to track the MS's identity related to the disputed access request message. According to Section V-C, JUDGE can track the corresponding MS by checking if the following equalities hold:
This function can overcome the drawback existed in the previous schemes based on the pseudonym system or conventional group signature technique, i.e., it is necessary to trust the HAC, and the grievant cannot validate whether the identity revealed by the HAC is real. However, with CPAL, the grievant does not need to trust the HAC and can validate the real identity of the corresponding user of the disputed access request message itself.
C. The Proposed CPAL Scheme Can Provide an Efficient User Revocation Function
User revocation can be executed when any illegal or exceptional events occur, e.g., MS's secret key has been compromised, and the punishment for defaulting MS. In our CPAL, the user revocation is realized by implementing two key update algorithms, i.e., HDPK Update and usk Update. By executing algorithms HDPK Update and usk Update, the user revocation can be executed efficiently. Particularly, the user revocation can revoke a group of users simultaneously.
Correctness: The correction of algorithms in Section V-E can hold based on the following two equations. In addition, the exposure problem of user status history can be resolved in the proposed CPAL, because the MS's secret key to be revoked and published is independent of its linkage information.
D. The Proposed CPAL Scheme Can Provide Anonymous User Linking
The network operators or service providers that are authorized by the HAC or MS , denoted as AUTLINKER, may need user's statistics on the CPAL of services. First, the HAC sends the master linking key to the appointed AUTLINKER. Assume that the AUTLINKER has collected some of signatures and the corresponding messages in the previous access of MS , e.g., two pairs of signatures and messages, ( ) and ( ). The AUTLINKER first checks if the signatures are valid. If so, using , If , it manifests that these signatures and the corresponding messages are generated by the same MS registered in the HN, while MS's identity will not be revealed.
In order to evaluate the ability of privacy preservation for user access authentication during roaming, we define three levels of user privacy, which are required for achieving authentication, anonymity, and AAUL, respectively, as shown in Table III . As discussed before, the AAUL function makes the privacy preservation of user more flexible. Any authorized entities including the MS itself can use this function to develop personalized applications, while guaranteeing the identity of the user will not be leaked.
Furthermore, the comprehensive comparisons of properties among the existing secure roaming schemes are shown in Table IV. From Table IV , we can see that our CPAL satisfies all security requirements in roaming services and has the level 3 ability of privacy preservation, which cannot be reached by other secure roaming schemes.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed CPAL scheme in terms of communication overhead and computation cost.
A. Computation Cost
In this section, we mainly compare our CPAL scheme with the existing two strong anonymous schemes [24] , [25] , rather than all secure roaming schemes, because other schemes do not have strong user anonymity. We first evaluate the computation cost during roaming, since this part might impact on the performance of the whole roaming service.
In the proposed CPAL scheme, the pairings can be precomputed and stored by MSs. During roaming, the VAS first computes to require the access request message of MS, it requires 1 exponentiation operation in G . Then, the MS generates an access request message , it requires 2 exponentiation operations in G to compute and . Next, in order to compute , , , and generate the signature, 2 exponentiations in G and 10 multiexponentiations (1 exponentiation [43] ) are required. The MS can cache . Instead of evaluating a pairing for each generation of a signature, can be computed by ; therefore, this step requires no pairing computation. In order to verify the signature of the MS, it requires 7 multiexponentiations and 1 pairing computation, since the VAS can derive by merging , , and and evaluating one pairing. The hash computation and the multiplication are considered negligible compared to exponentiation and pairing operations. Finally, the VAS also needs to compute the , which requires 1 exponentiation operation in G . Denote the computation costs of an exponentiation operation in G and multiexponentiation, and a pairing operation in G by , , and , respectively. According to [24] and [25] , we present the computation cost comparison of CPAL, scheme [24] and Priauth [25] during roaming in Table V .
From Table V , the computation costs of an MS and the VAS are and in the proposed CPAL scheme; in [24] , totally for the MS and the VAS, the computation costs are and , respectively; for Priauth [25] , the computation costs of an MS and the VAS are and , respectively. Once a dispute occurs on an access request during roaming, the user tracking algorithm requires only 1 multiexponentiation in G and a binary search. If a key-update by revocation is considered, since does not change regardless of revocation, the user tracking algorithm can directly determine the corresponding MS and thus minimize the computation. Judging a proof output by our user tracking algorithm requires 3 multiexponentiations and 2 pairing computations. There is no user tracking function in scheme [24] and Priauth [25] .
Once anonymous user linking is required, the linking algorithm computes 6 pairing operation for two given signatures and . If the linking test needs to be executed for a fixed link index , then only two pairing computations for are required for each new signature. In the proposed CPAL scheme, all revoked MSs must update their secret signing keys. Let be the number of revoked MSs. This updating requires multiexponentiations in G in our scheme. There are no anonymous user linking function in scheme [24] and Priauth [25] . Therefore, we present the computation cost comparison of CPAL, scheme [24] and Priauth [25] excluding the roaming in Table VI .
From Table VI , we can see that there are no values in scheme [24] and Priauth [25] , because there are no the corresponding functions in scheme [24] and Priauth [25] .
According to [44] , in order to study the computation costs, the experiments are conducted with pairing-based cryptography (PBC) [45] and multiprecision integer and rational arithmetic C/C++ library (MIRACL) [46] libraries running on a 3.0-GHz processor 512 MB-memory computing machine. The experimental results indicate that a single exponentiation operation almost costs 12.4 ms, and the corresponding pairing operation costs 20 ms. With the exact computation costs, we can conclude that the total computation costs of CPAL, scheme [24] , and Priauth [25] are 313.1, 168.5, and 275.3 ms, respectively. The computation costs of the user tracking and anonymous user linking algorithm are 102 and 120 ms, respectively. We can find that the computation costs of our CPAL scheme with access linkability is only larger 37.8 ms than that of Priauth [25] , but can provide user tracking, anonymous user linking, joining, and revocation function for dynamic membership that other schemes do not have.
B. Communication Overhead
We focus on the communication overhead during roaming, since this part might impact on the performance of the whole roaming service.
In order to evaluate the transmission cost, assume that the transmission cost between the MS and the HAC is 1 unit. Let the transmission cost of an authentication message between the MS and the VAS be unit, and between the VAS and the HAC be unit, respectively. Since the VAS locates the FN, which is far away from the HAC,
. We compare the transmission cost of CPAL with that of the existing schemes as shown in Table VII . Table VII shows the transmission overheads of the reference schemes. From Table VII, our CPAL, scheme [24] , Priauth [25] , and SFRIC [41] need to transfer authentication 3 messages between the MS and the VAS without any communication between the VAS and the HAC. Jiang's scheme [37] need to transfer 3 authentication messages between the MS and the VAS, and 2 authentication messages between the VAS and the HAC. Scheme [38] and EAP-based schemes need to transfer 4 authentication messages between the MS and the VAS, and 2 authentication messages between the VAS and the HAC.
In addition, we compare our proposed CPAL scheme with the conventional EAP-based schemes. We consider the following two cases in the EAP-based schemes 1) The VAS must fetch the fresh authentication vectors from the HAC; 2) The VAS has the fresh authentication vectors already. In the case 1), there are 4 messages between the MS and the VAS, and there are 2 messages between the VAS and HAC during one authentication procedure. The transmission cost of EAP-based schemes is In the case 2), since the VAS has the fresh authentication vectors already, it does not need to communicate with the HAC any more. Thus, the transmission cost of EAP-based schemes is However, in the proposed CPAL scheme, there are only 3 messages between the MS and the VAS during one authentication procedure. Therefore, the transmission cost of the proposed CPAL scheme is TOC, type of cryptosystem; SRR, security requirements of roaming service; UNI, universality; NOP, the number of parties; NOR, the number of rounds; SUA, strong user anonymity; URF, user revocation function; APP, the abilities of privacy preservation; JRD, efficient joining and revocation function for dynamic membership. Suppose that the VAS fetches authentication vectors during the authentication procedure. The average transmission cost of the EAP-based schemes is
We define a transmission improvement rate to evaluate the improvement of the proposed CPAL compared to the EAPbased scheme.
The definition of transmission improvement rate is as follows:
From the definition of , we know that the bigger the is, the smaller the transmission cost of our proposed scheme. Fig. 4 plots the transmission improvement rate varying with the number of authentication vectors , and the value that stands for the message transmission cost between the MS and the VAS. As can be seen from Fig. 4 , at the beginning, the is maximum (approximate to 1); when the size of authentication vectors increases, the decreases, then reaches 0.65 and tends to be stable. This is because in the initial stage, the VAS must communicate more frequently with the HAC to obtain fresh authentication vectors in the EAP-based schemes. Moreover, when the authentication message transmission cost between the MS and the VAS increases, similarly, will decrease and then attains to stability. The is always greater than 0.65, which manifests that the communication cost of CPAL is less than that of EAP-based schemes. The reason is that the proposed CPAL scheme does not need the message exchanging for getting authentication vectors between the VAS and the HAC, thus it avoids the additional communication overhead of obtaining authentication vectors.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a CPAL for roaming service, which can provide multilevel privacy preservation for the emerging paradigm of networking, such as the IoT. Particularly, the proposed CPAL can make authorized network operators or service providers link all the access information of the same user for statistical purposes, but they cannot know who the user is, what the current membership status of the user is, and the history of the user joining and revocation. Through extensive analysis, we demonstrate that CPAL resists various security threats and provides more flexible and elaborate privacy preservation including user tracking, anonymous user linking, joining, and revocation function for dynamic membership. In addition, performance evaluations demonstrate its efficiency in terms of communication and computation overhead. For the future work, we will study the possible behavior by internal attackers and extend the CPAL scheme to effectively resist such attacks. In addition, we will design the lightweight secure and privacy-preserving scheme supporting very large group of IoT devices. 
